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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of a negative socioeconomic shock on generosity by
analysing the responses of 1255 US citizens to dictator games spread out over eight
weeks of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each respondent plays four dic-
tator games corresponding to four different recipients: relatives, neighbours, strangers,
and the state. Despite the worsening of the pandemic and hence a high cost of do-
nating, individuals perceive increasing marginal benefits of donating and thus become
more generous over this timeframe. There is significant heterogeneity in the effects of
additional regressors, such as perceived contagion risk, on the likelihood and amount
donated to strangers, family members, or the government. At the same time, signifi-
cant effects of framing bring new evidence regarding the stability of social preferences.
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1 Introduction
During the Second World War, dozens of thousands of citizens protected Jewish people from
the Holocaust. The ”Righteous Among the Nations” bravely put their lives and their fam-
ilies’ lives at risk, saving neighbours, friends, as well as perfect strangers from an atrocious
destiny through acts of pure altruism. Indeed, many other circumstances in history have
shown how altruism and generosity flourish during hard times, providing strong evidence for
the existence of positive social preferences.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a unique event in modern times which presents a natural ex-
periment for investigating social preferences. Thus, this paper analyses altruism during the
COVID-19 pandemic in the US – one of the worst-hit countries.
The study regards the first lockdown containment measures as a large negative socioeco-
nomic shock, analysing individuals’ generosity as well as the stability of social preferences.
In particular, altruistic behaviours towards relatives, neighbours, strangers, and the govern-
ment (to support social services) are examined in an online experiment: participants from
the states of California, New York, and Washington play four dictator games, each for the
four types of recipients considered. Given that when exposed to negative exogenous shocks
altruistic behaviours are not likely to remain constant, and instead generosity could change
over time, results of the experiment are from a period of eight weeks of data collection. This
allows for a dynamically variable concept of generosity, in place of a static vision.
The rapid spread of the novel coronavirus left the three states in this study no choice but to
adopt lockdown policies, abruptly forcing millions into isolation. The pandemic also dras-
tically affected the US economy, with an unprecedented increase in unemployment rates
and shrinking GDP. Prolonged isolation and its direct economic consequences, along with
fear inflicted through widespread media coverage of increasing deaths likely affected social
preferences in different ways. In fact, mixed outcomes have been witnessed; whilst positive
altruistic behaviours were rife (large donations for hospitals and ventilators, shopping for
neighbours in high-risk categories), other events such as stockpiling of goods or not comply-
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ing with lockdown regulations were displays of self-oriented preferences.
Results from the experiment show how generosity towards each category evolves: there is
an increasingly positive effect of time spent in lockdown on the amount and likelihood of
donations in all categories, with self-reported concern for the pandemic playing a positive
and significant role as well. These findings are remarkable, as one might expect generosity
to fall as a consequence of the high price of donating (in the context of the drop in employ-
ment rates and financial resources recorded in the US in that period). In fact, even though
the recorded negative economic circumstances do play a role (for example, results show low
mean donations towards anonymous recipients compared to the rest of the literature 1), the
overall situation appears to increase the perceived marginal benefit of donating i.e. there is
a stronger warm-glow effect (Andreoni, 1989).
Of course, positive effects on donations to different recipients are not homogeneous – for
instance, being concerned by COVID-19 has a stronger effect on generosity towards familiar
recipients.
As a second objective, this paper analyses the stability of social preferences. Specifically,
the design of the study provides a comparative advantage which allows for an investigation
of the effect of framing on the stability of social preferences.
Perfectly rational answers on the four games should not depend on their order 2. Otherwise,
it would mean that some decisions could become a reference point for the other ones. Since
donations towards relatives are the highest on average, one would expect that if the dicta-
tor game with a relative is played first, this would set a reference point for all the following
tasks, negatively affecting donations in the remaining games. Indeed, the results capture this
framing effect, and lower donation amounts are recorded when a relatives’ game is played
first.
The results also detect another framing effect: the order in which the dictator games are
played has a significant influence on the donations towards anonymous recipients. This sug-
1See more for a comparison with the rest of the literature (Engel, 2011) in the Discussion section
2The games were administered in random order
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gests that when a direct bond between the agents is lacking, social preferences are more
unstable.
Understanding generosity is far from straightforward. Whilst economic models view social
preferences as a composition of a wide array of motivations such as reciprocity, efficiency con-
cerns (Charness and Rabin, 2002), trust (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995), cold prickle
effects (Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2014) etc., in the particular case of a crisis or per-
ceiving another in pain or difficulty, social preferences are likely to be linked to feelings of
empathy and compassion (Waal (2008), Story et al. (2015)). For example, when investi-
gating the role of empathy, Story et al. (2015) find that participants respond with stronger
altruism towards those clearly in distress: when asked to divide money versus dividing pain
(electric shocks) with recipients, a larger share of individuals allocate more painful stimuli
to themselves. Baseline altruism displayed towards anyone in pain – irrespective of one’s
relationship to the recipient – could also be related to the ”warm-glow” effect (Andreoni,
1989) and its feeling of reward in helping others, as well as pure distributive concerns fueled
by sentiments of fairness and justice (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
In reality, generosity could significantly differ depending on the nature of the relationship one
has with the recipient. Leider (2009) demonstrates that in the case of directed altruism that
favors friends over random strangers, the former is stronger than baseline altruism. More-
over, directed altruism is stronger even in the case where the individual takes into account
possible reciprocity in future interactions.
Similarly, expanding on the role of relationships in altruism, it is important to consider the
effect of group identity: Guala and Filippin (2017) find group identity – the part of an
individual’s self-concept derived from the affiliation with a social group – can significantly
influence people’s attitudes towards monetary allocations. As many studies have demon-
strated, individuals also behave very differently depending on context (Laury and Taylor,
2008), their gender (Heinz, 2011), social distance with others (Bohnet and Frey, 1999) or
whether the resources to donate are earned with effort (Cherry, 2002).
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Aside from the between-subject nature of this experiment, the design of this research is an
opportunity to investigate the role of framing on altruistic behaviours. Dreber et al. (2013)
and other studies investigate the assumption of preference stability by exploiting social fram-
ing effects. In fact, it appears that details like the name given to a game or the order of the
tasks can affect behaviours, even if Dreber et al. (2013) find that dictator games are not
that sensitive to social framing effects. The significant role of framing on attitudes towards
monetary allocations is also showed in Guala and Filippin (2017). Thus, in line with the rest
of the literature (Andreoni and Miller (2002), Guala and Filippin (2017)), the four different
dictator games are presented to participants in randomised order.
To conclude, the analysis considers the role of other variables reviewed in the literature, such
as gender and other demographics, and explores the effect of anxiety on generosity. The next
sections of the paper are organised as follows: the Methodology summarises the design of
the experiment, sampling methods, participants’ characteristics, procedure, and a descrip-
tion of the main variables of interest; Results are divided into descriptive and inferential
statistics, and the concluding remarks and possible future developments are then presented
in the Discussion.
2 Methodology
2000 subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk for an online experiment. Each
participant was paid .30 dollars, and recruitment was run between Monday and Wednes-
day for eight weeks starting on the 30th of March. To best observe how individuals with
similar backgrounds reacted to varying COVID-19 pandemic intensities across the weeks,
the recruitment was focused on three states in the United States: New York, Washington,
and California. These three states were chosen on the basis that they experienced different
pandemic situations in terms of magnitude and trends.
The original intention was, for the desired power of .80, to be able to detect effects between
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.30 and .35 standard deviations, in line with other dictator game experiments (Engel, 2011).
Across the eight weeks, a total of 2000 participants were recruited, which decreased to 1255
after the cleaning process. The final sample corresponds to 156 observations per week on
average, in line with the initial target.
Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the sample investigated: compared to the pop-
ulation of reference from the three states considered, age categories 25-34 and 35-44 are
over-represented, while lower percentages of individuals above 65 years old participated in
the experiment 3 (as it frequently happens with M Turk data collections (McDuffie, 2019).
In terms of educational attainments, the share of the population without a high-school
diploma is under-represented as more than 70 percent of the sample holds at least a bache-
lor’s degree. Finally, when evaluating differences between the employment status when com-
pleting the test and one month before, there is a 4.7 percentage points net shift from working
to unemployment positions, in line with the drastic increase in unemployment recorded dur-
ing COVID-19 pandemic.
Beyond the information related to participants, this research focuses on the three states,
California New York and Washington: additional tables and figures in the Appendix de-
scribe the evolution of unemployment (and related benefits) and the pandemic, between the
end of March and end of May.
Regarding the games, as a first task, participants were required to complete four dictator
games, administered in random order; each game had similar wording: ”Imagine that today
you have been given 1000 dollars. How much of this amount are you willing to give to [...]”.
However, the four games differed in the hypothetical recipient: an anonymous person X, the
current government (”to support public services”), a relative, or one neighbour. These four
decisions were all independent, and an integer number between 0 and 1000 could be typed
as an answer.
After the dictator games, participants were required to fill in a questionnaire on socio- demo-
3Four participants from the age category “Over 75” were merged with the larger “65-74” years old
category.
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graphics, attitudes and feelings. In particular, information was collected on information on
gender, age, current and previous (one month before) employment status, education, marital
status. In the second part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about their feelings
in the previous week, including their considerations towards COVID-19, on the current gov-
ernment the ability to complete daily tasks (related to the ability to manage workload and
home duties), and on their financial security.
To conclude, the dataset obtained online was enriched with state-specific information on
COVID-19 (number of total deaths and cases, and their percentage increase from the previ-
ous day 4) and unemployment (unemployment insurance weekly claims and insured unem-
ployment rates 5).
The following results section is based on two dependent variables: the amount donated for
each dictator game (continuous variable with a range of 0 to 1000 (dollars)), and the prob-
ability of donating; in this latter case, the dependent variable is a dummy which equals to
one for a positive donation. Furthermore to infer the dynamic effect of the pandemic on
generosity, several regressors are considered: total number and daily percentage changes in
deaths and cases, the week in which the experiment is completed, and the state of residence.
On this note, percentage change variables take into account the time of the daily announce-
ment for a certain state: this is because doing the experiment before or after a certain
announcement (a positive or negative change of the situation) could impact the respondents’
answers. The state-specific unemployment rate and amount of individuals receiving bene-
fits, together with answers on financial security and employment (current and one month
before) are considered as independent variables; moreover, the information collected in the
questionnaire will be used to investigate the role of the concern towards coronavirus, trust in
the government, moods (including anxiety), and demographics (gender, age, marital status,
4Information was obtained by the official websites of each state:
Washington https://www.coronavirus.wa.gov/ ,
California https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/Immunization/ncov2019.aspx,
New York State https://coronavirus.health.ny.gov/home
5UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Employment Training Administration
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp
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and education).
To conclude the description of the variables, given the order of the different games were ran-
domised for each respondent, the regressions will take into account when a certain dictator
game was completed compared to the other three, and a dummy variable to consider the
cases in which the game on relatives was played first.
To conclude the description of the variables, given the order of the different games were
randomised for each respondent, the regressions will take into account when a certain dic-
tator game was completed compared to the other three, and a dummy variable to consider
the cases in which the game on relatives was played first. To see why this is important
for capturing possible framing effects (which, in theory, should not affect our preferences
and decisions), consider the following example. Let us imagine that a respondent needs to
divide funds with an anonymous as first game, and the choice would be a number between
0 and 1000 dollars; in theory, the same range of options would be available in the case the
participant played this game as second and the one towards a relative (or another closer
recipient) as first. However, my prior is that in the latter case the range of possible dona-
tions towards the anonymous recipient that the participant unconsciously perceives would
be reduced from zero up to the donation to the relative, recalibrating the donations because
of what was previously given to a closer recipient: the first game then becomes a reference
point and could negatively impact the donation towards the anonymous recipient.
If this is the case, framing would have another significant effect on the investigated altruistic
behaviours, compromising the stability of social preferences.
3 Results
Descriptive Statistics
Data collected across the eight weeks show how participants exhibit diverse generosity be-
haviours towards each of the recipients: Figure 1 summarises mean donations in the four
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different dictator games.
As expected, given a stronger emotional bond, donations to relatives are strikingly higher
than any other dictator game considered: on average, participants are willing to give rela-
tives almost one-third of the total amount received.
The other three dictator games exhibit average donations closer to each other, with anony-
mous recipients receiving the least amount, then neighbours, followed by the government
through donations to finance public services being the third-highest category. How partici-
pants’ self-regarding and other-regarding preferences discriminate between recipients is also
reflected in the cumulative donations, shown in Figure 2: while around 10 percent of the
sample donate 0 to relatives, increasing up to 1000 dollars, around half do not share anything
with anonymous recipients, and 40 percent do not donate to neighbours and government (do-
nations to these two recipients exhibit similar patterns).
Respondents from the three states give different answers (Figure 3), with New York donations
to anonymous recipients being the lowest average overall, Washington residents particularly
generous towards neighbours (higher average than for the government) and relatives, and
California more altruistic towards anonymous and the government (compared to the other
two states).
Considering demographic information, women appear to donate less than men on average,
in all dictator games except on relatives: Figure 4 shows the discrepancy in donations by
gender, which will be further discussed in the inferential statistics section.
To conclude descriptive statistics, it is crucial to focus on the dynamics of donations across
the eight weeks of investigation: as time passes during this period, the coronavirus pandemic
is becoming more burdensome in the US, and citizens are in lockdown for an increasing
amount of time. Figure 5 shows how donations change over time, providing preliminary
insights into my hypotheses.
Overall, all four mean donations increase between the first and the eighth week, following
similar patterns even if with different gradients: while donation increases are flatter for rel-
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atives, dollars corresponding to anonymous more than double in two months, and double in
the case of dictator games on neighbours and government.
Inferential Statistics
In this section, results from regressions are grouped considering each of the four dictator
games as a different subsection: The main tables contain the independent variables relevant
to evaluate my hypotheses, however, a brief final subsection describes the main findings on
the other regressors.
To analyse results from the different experiments, a robust heteroskedastic OLS regression
is run for measuring the impact of the independent variables on the amount donated. List
(2007) allows for dictators to take money from recipients, demonstrating that fewer agents
are willing to donate in this case than the standard case: for this reason, I also run Tobit
regressions to consider the possibility of censored negative replies from participants.
As shown in Figure 2, answers from the experiments are in line with findings in the rest of
the literature on dictator games, with a large share of participant giving zero to the recipient.
For this reason, a quantile regression is performed, and the following tables report effects
of the first (only for relatives, there is no variation in the other games), second and third
quartiles. The last column of the results tables shows the average marginal effects of the
independent variables on the probability of donating (logit regression).
Dictator Game towards an Anonymous Recipient
Table 2 summarises the main findings from the dictator game with an anonymous recipient.
The ordinal variable on being concerned with COVID-19, as well as the daily percentage
change in deaths, have no significant effects. At the same time, there is a significant positive
effect of the weeks following the first one on the amount donated: in both OLS and Tobit
regressions there is a positive trend with donations reaching a peak in the last week (an
increase of 105 dollars on average, according to OLS results).
None of the variables which measure the “concerned by COVID-19” effect have an impact
on the probability of donating towards anonymous recipients.
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Dictator Game towards a Neighbour Recipient
In Table 3, results from regressions show the effects of independent variables on the amount
donated, and the probability of donating, to a neighbor recipient. Considering the statement
“COVID-19 is concerning”, compared to ”Strongly Disagree” the other answers do not bring
significant changes in the amount donated. However, the logit regression shows a significant
increase in the probability of donating in all categories of the ordinal variable.
This effect is particularly strong for those who select “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”, with a
significant increase (at the 1% significance level) in the probability by 48 and 55 percentage
points respectively.
At the same time, playing in the weeks after the first one significantly increases the amount
donated: this is shown by both OLS and Tobit regressions, with all weeks significantly higher
than the first one. The amount donated increases across the period of analysis, even if not
always in a monotonic way: in fact, in both regressions there is a small drop in the increase
in week seven. From the fourth week onward, the positive effect is also significant for .5
and .75 quantiles, with the latter showing larger effects. The probability of donating also
increases compared to the first week: from 19 percentage points more in week two, up to 35
in week eight.
Dictator Game towards a Relative Recipient
The main results on donations towards a relative recipient are summarised in Table 4. In this
case as with the neighbours’ case, self-reported concern for COVID-19 increases the amount
donated (both OLS and Tobit have significant results for ”Agree” and ”Strongly Agree”).
Considering the quantile regressions it seems this effect is concentrated at the high end of the
distribution of the donations (.75 quantile is significant for both options highlighted before).
Tne finding which is uncommon to the other dictator games is the effect of the percentage
change in deaths on the amount donated: for high amounts (Q.75), a positive change signif-
icantly increases donations by around 3 dollars, on average.
Considering the weeks after the first one, for small (Q.25) donations, week three has a signif-
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icant positive effect, while for large (Q.75) donations the last week sees a significant positive
effect. In this latter case, the probability of donating also has a 23 percentage point increase.
Dictator Game towards the Government as Recipient
Considering the dictator game towards the government (to support public services), Table 5
shows how being concerned by COVID-19 scarcely affects the dependent variables: selecting
”Strongly Agree” is the only option which significantly increases the amount donated (at the
5% significance level, only according to the Tobit regression). It also enhances the likelihood
of responding with a positive donation (43 percentage points increase, 5% significant).
The percentage change in deaths does not bring significant effects, which instead remains for
the weeks following the first one: in this case, for OLS regression, the third, fifth and eight
have an increase in donations, and Tobit counts the fourth and seventh as well among the
significant ones.
As for quantile regressions, for the second quartile weeks, sixth and eight show a positive
effect in donations, and considering the logit fourth and eight have a significant impact on
rising the likelihood of donating.
Game Ordering
Focusing on the effect of the position in which a dictator game is played compared to the
others, Table 2 considers donations to anonymous: playing the version on relatives first does
not significantly affect quantity nor probability of donating. Instead, not responding on the
anonymous game first significantly reduces the amount donated to this category of recipi-
ents. In particular, playing this game second brings the lowest amount donated, as well as
a significant reduction in the probability of donating.
Similar conclusions can be made when considering a neighbour as recipients: Table 3 shows
how playing the dictator on relatives first significantly reduces the amount donated to a
neighbour, both according to the OLS (-29.09 dollars) and the Tobit. At the same time,
different positions of this game do not significantly change the amount donated (except for
11
the case of playing this third compared to first, which has a significantly positive effect in the
Tobit regression). However, second and third positions significantly increase the likelihood
of a positive donation by nine percentage points (compared to playing it first).
To conclude, Tables 4 and 5 highlight the differences of the games towards a relative and the
government compared to the first two discussed: in both cases, the ordering does not bring
significant effects, and the same is true for having a relative recipient in the first game.
Other Regressors
Tables 6 and 7 report the effects of the other regressors – carefully chosen given their promi-
nence in the wider literature on dictator games – on the dependent variables.
Considering gender, the different regressions show no differences in the probability of donat-
ing. However, there is a significant reduction in the amount donated to the recipient in the
case of female respondents; this is shown in the OLS regression, with significant effects only
seen in anonymous, government and neighbor games (no significant effects of gender in the
treatment with relatives). This result is also confirmed by Tobit regression, but only for the
dictator towards the government.
Compared to single respondents, those who are married or in a domestic relationship donate
more to anonymous and neighbor, and in the latter case, the likelihood of donating increases
as well.
A variable that has a strong significant effect across different games and regressions is the ex-
tent to which the respondents agree to the statement: “The current government is credible.”
Compared to those who select the option “Strongly Disagree,” those agreeing or strongly
agreeing appear to increase the amount donated in the OLS and Tobit regressions. There
is also an increase in the probability of donating not only towards the government but also
to anonymous and neighbour recipients as well. In contrast, the answers on the statement
“COVID-19 could harm my family” do not bring significant effects on the outcome variables,
except for a decrease in the probability of donating to a neighbour if the answer is “Strongly
Agree.”
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Living in different states brings some significant effects: donations from Washington are
significantly higher if towards a neighbour (OLS, Tobit) and government (Tobit). For the
probability of donating, being from Washington significantly enhances the likelihood in all
except neighbour dictator games.
Age also has an impact: compared to the category 18-24, 35-44 and 45-54 see a reduction
in the amount donated towards anonymous and the government (OLS and Tobit), while for
the neighbour game only the first of these two categories has a significantly negative impact.
The 45-54 category also reduces the likelihood of donating towards the government and its
public services.
Among the employment and financial-related variables, higher unemployment rates bring a
(small, compared to the effects discussed for the COVID-19 related regressors) significant
reduction in donations towards neighbours (OLS, Tobit).
A broad effect of self-reported anxiety is visible across the inferential results: strongly agree-
ing on the statement that “Overall, in the last week I felt anxious” significantly increases
amounts donated to anonymous, and also the lower categories have a positive effect on other
dictator games (neighbour and government). There is also a positive effect on the probability
of donating to anonymous, relatives, and government.
Overall, regressors show significant effects on donations towards a relative very rarely (none
of them in OLS and Tobit, considering the variables mentioned in this sub-section).
4 Discussion
The results of this experiment show that a negative socioeconomic shock such as COVID-19
and its associated lockdown measures evoke a largely positive change of altruistic behaviours.
In a sense, policies adopted during the pandemic can be viewed as a different form of social
distancing depicted in the dictator game literature so far (Hoffman et al. (1996), Bohnet
and Frey (1999). In Hoffman’s research, however, “isolation” of the donor through single
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and double blinded dictator games results in data to support the hypothesis that as social
isolation increases, there is a further shift toward lower offers. Given that this is not in line
with the current study, a closer look at the regressors is warranted.
When considering the regressors capturing negative sentiment around the health aspects of
the pandemic (anxiety; concerned by COVID-19), positive effects on donations are strongest
in the anonymous dictator games. Similarly, regressors capturing negative economic impacts
(unemployment rate; employment status before and after experiment; financial status), have
the strongest positive effect on donations and likelihood of donations in the anonymous and
government dictator games. A likely explanation here is that the increase in overall economic
and health fallout from the pandemic increases the perceived marginal benefit of donating
i.e. there is a stronger warm-glow effect. This effect is stronger towards anonymous recipi-
ents for whom we have the least amount of direct information about, and where perceptions
are instead fed by media, thus evoking sentiments of empathy described in de Waal (2008).
However, regressors which help to explain the phenomenon of increasing donations during
lockdown do not have homogeneous effects across the different dictator games. For instance,
the percentage change in deaths is not a significant regressor in general, with one interest-
ing exception: for high donations towards relatives, it has a positive effect on the amount
donated. High donations could indicate a positive bond with relatives, and intuitively a neg-
ative context in terms of deaths could trigger empathy sentiments and the need to protect
whoever is part of the family. Furthermore, almost all the other independent variables in the
relative’s dictator game are not significant. Donations towards relatives probably depend on
much deeper social dynamics, built across years of relationship – these aspects are probably
not captured by the regressors considered. For example, direct lines of communication (not
recorded in this dataset) would have a strong effect in bridging perceptions to reality.
Overall, given the negative socioeconomic shock, the price of donating at the onset of the
pandemic is higher than other dictator game experiments, and hence would explain why do-
nations towards anonymous recipients are lower than the ones documented in the literature
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(Engel (2011) calculates an average of 28% of the available sum donated). Another explana-
tion for lower overall donations could come from Güth et al. (2007), who describe internet
users as more self-regarding. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the sample shows
high absolute levels of unemployment, financial insecurity and negative feelings remain more
or less constant across time, suggesting the price of donating does not increase over the 8
weeks.
Considering the answers on self-reported financial security, a decrease in price of donations
due to forced savings should be also excluded.
On the stability of social preferences, the results bring further evidence: Dreber (2013) finds
them “less sensitive” to framing than the previous literature thought, however I show that
this is not homogeneous across recipients. In particular, playing towards an anonymous re-
cipient not as the first game reduces the amount and probability of donating towards that
category, and if a neighbour is considered after a relative, there is a negative effect on the av-
erage donation. These findings demonstrate how individuals could end up creating reference
points depending on how tasks are framed, showing that framing can affect the stability of
social preferences if there is not a strong bond between the players.
At the same time, findings on gender show higher altruism than men (but not in the case
of a relative recipient), which is not in line with Heinz (2011) and Selten and Ockenfels
(1996). On this note, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) show how men are more generous
when this has cheap consequences. However, it could be argued that the price of generosity
in our experiment is higher than average (considering the negative socioeconomic shock and
related consequences), de facto suggesting that gendered differentials could be mostly due
to the relationship between dictator and receiver than the price of donating.
With respect to age, it is possible that the two categories “34-44” and “45-54” consistently
donate less than the others because they have family members (children) financially relying
on them. However, findings are not in line with Güth et al. (2007), which describes how
older age categories care more about equality in sharing.
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Finally, the role of reciprocity cannot be ruled out, especially in the case of government
dictator games. In fact, the “anxiety” regressor effect is significant and the highest for
government as a receiver. A negative socioeconomic shock which evokes anxiety across the
population could raise the expectation that if donations are made to the state, there is a
much greater chance of the state then reciprocating by providing safety measures such as
unemployment benefits, cash handouts, or other financial relief packages. Further evidence,
such as a specific ultimatum game experiment, could clarify the mechanisms behind this last
hypothesis.
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[21] Güth, W., Schmidt, C., & Sutter, M. (2007). Bargaining outside the lab–a newspaper
experiment of a three-person ultimatum game. The Economic Journal, 117(518), 449-469.
[22] Heinz, M., Juranek, S., & Rau, H. A. (2012). Do women behave more reciprocally than
men? Gender differences in real effort dictator games. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 83(1), 105-110.
[23] Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. (1996). Social distance and other-regarding
behavior in dictator games. The American economic review, 86(3), 653-660.
[24] Holm, H. J., & Danielson, A. (2005). Tropic trust versus Nordic trust: experimental
evidence from Tanzania and Sweden. The Economic Journal, 115(503), 505-532.
[25] Jakiela, P. (2013). Equity vs. efficiency vs. self-interest: on the use of dictator games to
measure distributional preferences. Experimental Economics, 16(2), 208-221.
[26] Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a constraint on profit
seeking: Entitlements in the market. The American economic review, 728-741.
[27] Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2005). The decision maker matters: Individual versus
group behaviour in experimental beauty-contest games. The Economic Journal, 115(500),
200-223.
[28] Korenok, O., Millner, E. L., & Razzolini, L. (2014). Taking, giving, and impure altruism
in dictator games. Experimental Economics, 17(3), 488-500.
[29] Laury, S. K., & Taylor, L. O. (2008). Altruism spillovers: Are behaviors in context-free
experiments predictive of altruism toward a naturally occurring public good?. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 65(1), 9-29.
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